Regular Arab forces entered the interstate phase of the war against מדינת ישראל MEDINAT YISRAʾEL on 15 May 1948, after the end of the Mandate. Forces from Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon participated on different fronts and schedules. Their shared opposition to the survival of sovereignty by יהודים YEHUDIM did not produce one unified command or identical territorial ambitions.

How did the Arab League justify intervention?

Its dated communication to the United Nations rejected partition and advocated a unitary state. It presented intervention as protection of life and restoration of order. The stated policy nevertheless denied the political existence of the independent state just proclaimed by יהודים YEHUDIM. That establishes antizionism in the League’s program; its assurance of civilian protection must be tested against military conduct.1

The League stated its proposed political outcome:

the only fair and just solution to the problem of Palestine is the creation of United State of Palestine.2

That unitary program rejected the separate sovereignty proclaimed by יהודים YEHUDIM.

The document’s claim that more than a quarter of a million Arab inhabitants had been displaced is a contemporary diplomatic estimate. It is neither a household register nor an audited total for the first day of invasion.

What did national leaders experience that morning?

דוד בן-גוריון DAVID BEN-GURION’s 15 May diary records an air attack during his early broadcast, fire near the airfield, wounded people and damaged aircraft. It also reports approaching forces on several fronts. The entry establishes that the first night of governmental authority brought immediate military danger; it does not supply a complete first-day casualty list.3

Why were the Arab governments’ aims different?

The scholarly study by אב״י שליים AVI SHLAIM, cited in the inherited article, distinguishes common opposition to national sovereignty by יהודים YEHUDIM from disagreement over the political arrangement that should replace it:

there was no consensus on the future of Palestine.4

That distinction explains why an invasion coalition could act against the new state while competing over its aftermath. The exact quotation is retained from the existing sourced study; original edition verification remains separate. It does not weaken the documented hostility toward the state’s existence.

Did foreign military participation begin only on this date?

Arab Legion forces had already fought at כפר עציון KFAR EẒʾYON before 15 May. The date therefore marks the conventional interstate phase, not the first foreign soldier or the beginning of all violence. The earlier phase had already lasted more than five months. The response required the national institutions to turn self-defense into the defense of sovereign government.

How is this dated?

The Arab League communication is dated 15 May and was circulated as S/745 on 16 May. The local 15 May diary independently records the opening attacks. TJD’s fixed Hebrew calendar route is ו׳ באייר ה׳תש״ח 6th 𝑜𝑓 Iyar, AM 5708. Later report dates and earlier Arab Legion operations are retained separately; no single crossing hour is assigned to all forces.5 6

Guided reflections

  • How can a coalition share opposition to sovereignty by יהודים YEHUDIM while disagreeing about the political order to replace it?
  • Why must the League’s declared civilian protections be tested against actual operations?

Footnotes

  1. https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Cablegram_from_the_Secretary-General_of_the_League_of_Arab_States_to_the_Secretary-General_of_the_United_Nations S/745, sections 8–10; English transcription of UN document, circulated 16 May. ↩
  2. https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Cablegram_from_the_Secretary-General_of_the_League_of_Arab_States_to_the_Secretary-General_of_the_United_Nations S/745, section 10, proposed political structure; English transcription. ↩
  3. https://bengurionarchive.bgu.ac.il/en/node/8733 15 May diary, early broadcast and attack reports; archive translation. ↩
  4. Shlaim, The Rise and Fall, p. 38; passage retained from the inherited article; original edition not newly inspected. ↩
  5. https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Cablegram_from_the_Secretary-General_of_the_League_of_Arab_States_to_the_Secretary-General_of_the_United_Nations Dated cablegram and circulation identification. ↩
  6. https://bengurionarchive.bgu.ac.il/en/node/8733 15 May diary. ↩

Works cited

  1. Shlaim, Avi. The Rise and Fall of the All-Palestine Government in Gaza. Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 20, no. 1, 1990, pp. 37–53. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2537321. Accessed 2025 Jan. 08.