Operation נחשון NAHSHON began.

The supplied report assigns a leadership decision to 1 April. יוסף טבנקין YOSEF TABENKIN's participant reconstruction instead places it on the evening of 31 March, after the failed convoy. The institutional history dates an operational order to 3 April; בני Morris BENNY dates an order issued by the commander to 4 April. These may reflect different stages or documents, but the original orders must establish that relationship. No single date is substituted for all of them.^{1 2 3}

The first פלמ״ח PALMAḤ captured القسطل AL-QASTAL. on 2–3 April and the ההגנה HAʾHAGANA destroyed an Arab armed headquarters. on 4–5 April were preparatory operations. They do not mean the main force was already conducting every later task on those nights.

Its immediate purpose was to reopen the supply road by holding ground, rather than depending only on escorts attached to individual vehicles. שמעון אבידן ŜIMʾON AVIDAN commanded the operation, with forces drawn from several formations. The institutional account describes three battalions, transport arrangements and the arrival of weapons; those retrospective inventories are not original manifests.⁴

Tabenkin describes the purpose in his later assessment:

ᴏʀɪɢɪɴᴀʟ:

לפריצת דרך אספקה לירושלים⁵

ᴛʀᴀɴꜱʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴ:

to open a supply route to Jerusalem⁶

He argues that command tasks remained narrower than the offensive strategy he favored. His role as a participant gives insight, but his retrospective strategic argument is not an original operation order.

The institutional history attributes to יגאל ידין YIGAEL YADIN guidance to hold positions near villages and seize the villages only when necessary. Plan Dalet's wider conditional provisions for destruction and expulsion are examined in ההגנה HAʾHAGANA approved Plan ד DALET.. Orders, particular operations and civilian outcomes require separate evidence; a restrictive instruction does not prove universal restraint, and a conditional expulsion clause does not prove every family was expelled.⁷

Morris connects the operation to implementation of the wider plan. His account identifies both convoy protection and attacks on enemy bases as its objectives. That interpretation can be tested against ההגנה HAʾHAGANA captured خلدة KHULDA. and ההגנה HAʾHAGANA captured دير محيسن DAYR MUḤAYSIN., whose local dates, withdrawals and civilian histories remain distinct.

The A supply convoy reached ירושלים YERUŜALAYIM. reached the city during this phase, but its exact arrival date and identity require reconciliation. Fighting around القسطل AL-QASTAL continued, and control of the whole corridor was not permanent. Supplying a threatened city demanded repeated protected movements, not one headline announcing relief.

The retained assigned date is כ״ו באדר ב׳ ה׳תש״ח 26th 𝑜𝑓 Adar II, AM 5708, 26 Adar II 5708. The IDF institutional investigation explicitly gives the night of 5–6 April, and Tabenkin says the operation began before dawn on 6 April. The Hebrew day began at sunset on 5 April. The supplied report's night of 6–7 reading is not adopted; its retrospective Palmach wording is compared with the more explicit opening-night accounts. Decision 31 March/1 April, orders 3/4 April and preparatory capture 3 April are earlier stages, with their own conflicts.^{8 9}

The prior verified calendar row is retained as an existing review record. It does not approve the revised H 1 or expanded body.

• Why should a leadership decision, a field order and an opening night have separate dates?
• What local evidence would test the relationship between village instructions and civilian outcomes?