On 8 June 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson used the Washington–Moscow hotline to explain an American aircraft dispatch after Israeli forces attacked USS Liberty. The message sought to prevent the Soviet government from interpreting the response as American entry into the wider war.1

We wish you to know that investigation is the sole purpose of this flight of aircraft, and hope that you will take appropriate steps to see that proper parties are informed.2

The message called the attack apparently an error. That wording records Johnson's immediate description to Moscow; it is not a final investigation of the attack or a finding about intent. The attack itself has a separate article.

A military memorandum prepared later that day describes the response in broader operational terms. Charles M. Gettys of the National Military Command Center recorded that the Sixth Fleet had ordered armed aircraft to defend Liberty and directed pilots to remain clear of land.3

These documents answer different questions. The president's message states the assurance Washington gave Moscow. The military memorandum records orders within the American response. Their different wording should remain visible. Neither document alone reconstructs every flight or establishes what every official knew at each moment.

The diplomatic stakes extended beyond the damaged ship. الأهرام AL-AHRĀM had carried an allegation of American and British air intervention. Johnson now explained a real aircraft dispatch through an urgent private channel. Keeping that dispatch distinct from earlier allegations is essential: an American response to an attack on an American vessel on 8 June does not prove that American aircraft had conducted the Israeli opening attacks.

How is this dated?

The message was approved at 11:00 a.m. Washington time, transmitted at 11:17, and received by the Soviet hotline station at 11:24 on 8 June 1967. Its date corresponds to 29 Iyar 5727. The article records that communication, rather than assigning all subsequent investigations to the attack date.4

Guided reflections

  • Why might Moscow interpret an aircraft dispatch differently without a direct explanation from Washington?
  • How should a historian relate a diplomatic assurance about investigation to a military order to defend a ship?

Footnotes

  1. Johnson to Kosygin, 8 June 1967, 11:17 a.m., FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. XIX, doc. 212, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d212. The purpose described here is inferred from the assurance and request that Moscow inform others. ↩
  2. Johnson to Kosygin, doc. 212. English original. ↩
  3. Gettys, “Memorandum for the Record,” 8 June 1967, 3:30 p.m., FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. XIX, doc. 219, para. 3, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d219. ↩
  4. FRUS, doc. 212, source note. ↩

Works cited

  1. Schwar, Harriet Dashiell, ed. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968. Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2004. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19.