On 10 June 1967, Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin warned President Lyndon B. Johnson that continued fighting could bring independent Soviet action and a direct clash. The message moved beyond a demand for another diplomatic declaration. It explicitly raised the possibility of military measures.1

The English translation preserved in the American record states:

We propose that you demand from Israel that it unconditionally cease military action in the next few hours. On our part, we will do the same. We purpose to warn Israel that, if this is not fulfilled, necessary actions will be taken, including military.2

Kosygin presented Israeli action as aggression and treated the UN Security Council's efforts as ineffective. Those were his judgments, not a fresh adjudication by the Council. His warning made the ongoing war a possible point of direct confrontation between the two superpowers.

Johnson's reply stressed American pressure on מדינת ישראל MEDINAT YISRAʾEL to make its ceasefire effective. It also asked Moscow to act through its own relationship with the Syrian Arab Republic:

We have no means of reaching Syrian Government and hope that you have been making similar appeals to them.3

The exchange shows both confrontation and an effort to coordinate restraint. Washington relayed Israeli assurances, while Moscow threatened consequences and was asked to reach Damascus. מדינת ישראל MEDINAT YISRAʾEL retained its own military decisions, but its leaders also had to reckon with the danger of intervention by a much larger power. The messages do not prove that the Soviet government had issued operational orders for an attack.

The previous day's الاتحاد AL-ITTIḤĀD coverage had described Soviet policy through peace and national liberation. The private threat adds evidence about the coercive means behind that public vocabulary. Neither source should be made to erase the other.

How is this dated?

Both messages are dated 10 June 1967, corresponding to 2 Sivan 5727. The American file records a sight translation of Kosygin's message at 9:00 a.m. and delivery to Johnson at 9:05; Johnson's reply was transmitted at 9:39 Washington time. These are communication records, not the date of a demonstrated Soviet military intervention.4

Guided reflections

  • What does the inclusion of possible military action add to a diplomatic demand for a ceasefire?
  • How does the exchange reveal both the reach and the limits of American and Soviet influence over the belligerents?

Footnotes

  1. Kosygin to Johnson, 10 June 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. XIX, doc. 243, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d243. ↩
  2. Doc. 243. U.S. government's contemporary English translation of the Russian message; original Russian not collated here. ↩
  3. Johnson to Kosygin, 10 June 1967, 9:39 a.m., FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. XIX, doc. 246, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d246. English original. ↩
  4. FRUS, docs. 243 and 246, source notes. ↩

Works cited

  1. Schwar, Harriet Dashiell, ed. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968. Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2004. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19.