The UN Security Council ordered a cease-fire.

On 6 June 1967, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 233, calling on the governments involved in the war to stop firing and military activity immediately. Agreement on that demand concealed sharp disagreement about what should follow. The adopted text did not require withdrawal to the positions held before the war.¹

The resolution described its demand as:

as a first step

The Republic of Iraq's representative, Adnan Pachachi, characterized the result as:

a complete surrender to Israel²

Those brief phrases locate the disagreement. Stopping the fighting could be treated as an urgent measure that left other questions open, or condemned because it left Israeli forces in positions gained during the war. The Soviet representative attributed responsibility to מדינת ישראל MEDINAT YISRAʾEL; that accusation did not become a finding in the resolution. The Council president, the Kingdom of Denmark's Hans R. Tabor, defended the practical priority of ending hostilities.³

The distinction mattered to מדינת ישראל MEDINAT YISRAʾEL. A ceasefire might arrest immediate danger while leaving unresolved the threats that had preceded the war, passage through Tiran, territorial arrangements, and recognition of Jewish sovereignty. Conversely, governments demanding withdrawal could regard a ceasefire without it as preserving Israeli battlefield gains. These were competing programs, even where their proponents agreed that shooting should stop.

The Arabic communist appeal printed in الاتحاد AL-ITTIḤĀD that day explicitly connected stopping the war with withdrawing armies. Comparing the newspaper with the adopted resolution exposes a concrete difference in proposed action. Neither a newspaper appeal nor a unanimous Council vote establishes compliance on the ground.