ثورة فلسطين - أسبابها ونتائجها
The Palestine Revolt: Its Causes and Consequencesby Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā

Page 452

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فأما أهل شرق الأردن فقد سيموا من الخسف والاستعباد، ما لا نظير له في بلد من البلاد، إذ باعهم أميرهم لملك الإنكليز بيعًا سياسيًّا بعقد معاهدة لا يطيق ذلها أحد، ولا يقيم على خسفها إلا عير الحي والوتد، فاكتفى أذكاهم فهمًا وأقواهم عزمًا باسترحام الأمير لتعديل بعض مواد العقد، وتخفيف وطأة ما فيه من أحكام الرق، وهم قادرون الآن على تمزيق ذلك الصك، ونبذ ما انتحله عاقده من حق المُلك، وهي قدرة لا تدوم لهم، إذا طال أمد هذا الحكم عليهم.

وأما أهل فلسطين، فقد انحصر همهم في مقاومة الوطن القومي للصهيونيين، ومطالبة الإنكليز بنظام حكم نيابي يساوي بينهم وبين غرباء اليهود المعتدين، ونرى الإنكليز لا يسمعون لهم شكوى، ولا ينصفونهم في دعوى، بل يحابون اليهود وينصرونهم عليهم، ويمهدون لهم انتزاع رقبة أرضهم من أيديهم، والاستيلاء على مرافقها ومنافعها، والاستئثار معهم بمصالح حكومتها، وغرضهم الباطن من ذلك تفريق الوحدة العربية في قلب بلادها، وإيجاد أعداء للعرب من غير الإنكليز يشغلونهم بهم عن عداوتهم، ويعلِّقون أمل الفريقين ببقاء حكمهم عليهم.

وأما سببه الظاهر فهو أن اليهود أقوى من العرب أهل البلاد مالاً واتحادًا ونفوذًا ماديًّا ومعنويًّا في إنكلترة وسائر أوربة وفي الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وغيرها، لا الوفاء بما يسمى (وعد بلفور) والإبرام لعهده، فكم من وعد أخلفوه، وكم من عهد نكثوه؟ كوعودهم لمصر ومعاهدة السودان معها، ولقد وعدوا العرب بما عاهدوا عليه الملك حسينًا من قبل أن يَعِدوا اليهود، وكان وعدهم له باستقلال جميع البلاد العربية بحدودها الطبيعية الشاملة لجزيرة العرب والعراق وفلسطين وسورية ومنها كليكية صريحًا جليًّا مع استثناء لعدن وتحفظ في سواحل سورية الشمالية (لبنان) والبصرة، وأن للعرب لقوة في بلادهم أعظم من قوة اليهود؛ ولكنهم كانوا يجهلون قدرها وإقامة البرهان المقنع للإنكليز عليها، وهي قوة الوحدة فيما لهم من الكثرة، وسنبين قيمتها في الفصل الثالث من هذا المقال.

فالإنكليز كغيرهم من أهل أوربة لا يعرفون حقًّا إلا للقوي، ولا يفون بوعد ولا عهد إلا للقوي، ولا يعدلون في حكم إلا مع المتساوين في القوة والضعف، فإن

English
translation

The people of Transjordan, however, have suffered oppression and enslavement without parallel. Their emir sold them politically to the king of the English by a treaty whose humiliation no one could bear, and whose oppression only the village donkey and the tent peg could endure. Their most perceptive and resolute people were content to plead with the emir to amend some articles and ease its conditions of servitude. They can now tear up that document and reject the sovereign right its signatory assumed, but that ability will not last if this rule continues over them.

The people of Palestine have focused on resisting the Zionists' national home and asking the English for representative government that would put them on an equal footing with the aggressive Jewish newcomers. We see that the English neither hear their complaints nor grant them justice. Instead, they favor and support the Jews against them, prepare the way for them to seize ownership of their land and control its facilities and benefits, and, together with them, monopolize the interests of its government. Their hidden aim is to divide Arab unity at the heart of Arab lands and create enemies for the Arabs other than the English, so that the two sides will remain occupied with one another and both will hope for continued English rule.

The apparent reason is that the Jews are stronger than the Arabs who live there in money, unity, and material and moral influence in England, the rest of Europe, the United States, and elsewhere. It is not fidelity to what is called the “Balfour Declaration” or to its pledge. How many promises have they broken and treaties violated? Consider their promises to Egypt and their treaty with it concerning Sudan. They promised the Arabs, in their agreement with King Hussein before they promised the Jews, independence for all Arab lands within their natural borders, including the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Cilicia, with an exception for Aden and a reservation concerning the northern Syrian coast (Lebanon) and Basra. The Arabs have greater power in their own lands than the Jews, but did not know its extent or how to make a convincing case for it to the English. It is the power of unity in their numbers. We shall explain its value in the third part of this article.

Like other Europeans, the English recognize rights only for the strong, keep promises and treaties only with the strong, and rule justly only when parties are equal in strength and weakness. If

Analysis

Riḍā condemns the Transjordan agreement as a surrender by its emir and says Arabs in ארץ ישראל EREẒ YISRAʾEL seek representative rule and oppose the Zionist national home. The agreement signed on 1928-02-20 required British participation in foreign communications, finance, and armed forces; Riḍā's language of servitude is his political judgment on those controls. He charges the English with aiding Jewish land acquisition to divide Arabs and preserve English rule. The alleged hidden motive is his inference, not established by this text. He also calls the British promise to King Hussein clear and inclusive of ארץ ישראל EREẒ YISRAʾEL. McMahon's letter of 1915-10-24 had territorial reservations, and the British government publicly interpreted one as excluding the land west of the Jordan in 1922. The scope of the pledge was disputed; these documents establish the rival readings, not a settled meaning. His claim that English policy obeys strength continues on p. 453.

Official mandate records support Riḍā's statement that Palestinian Arabs sought representative government, while showing why a British proposal failed. The 1922 scheme provided ten elected Arab members and two elected Jewish members alongside ten officials and the High Commissioner. Arab leaders rejected and boycotted it because it fell short of responsible self-government and required acceptance of the mandate framework. The record therefore supports the demand for representative rule but shows that the dispute concerned the council's limited power and official control, not only equal standing between Arabs and Jews.

Britain's 1922 declaration on Egypt also clarifies Riḍā's reference to promises and a Sudan agreement. Britain ended the protectorate and declared Egypt independent, but reserved Sudan and three other matters to British discretion. The declaration was unilateral because a treaty settlement had not been reached, and it kept the prior position on the reserved matters until later agreements. This supports the grievance about incomplete sovereignty while correcting any suggestion that the 1922 settlement was a concluded British-Egyptian treaty on Sudan.

The land grievance had a documented basis. The Shaw Commission found that large sales between 1921 and 1929 displaced Arab cultivators without replacement land, that the land companies acted with government knowledge, and that a landless and discontented class was forming. This supports Riḍā's concern about dispossession and failed protection. It does not establish his further claim that Britain pursued the process in order to divide Arabs and preserve British rule.