צה״ל ẒAHAL launched Operation חורב ḤOREV in the נגב NEGEV.

The December 19 diary records government agreement to proceed in the נגב NEGEV, alongside disagreement about diplomatic risks, ירושלים YERUŜALAYIM and dealings with Hashemite ruler عبدالله ABDULLAH. That decision authorized or confirmed planned action; it was not the first attack. ³

The Defence Ministry’s retrospective places the intended opening on December 20 and explains a two-day delay caused by rain and road failure. Transport problems prevented the required concentration despite tractors and traffic control. An operational order, intended opening and actual opening must each keep their dates. ⁴

The Hebrew archive transcription supplies the timetable:

ᴏʀɪɢɪɴᴀʟ:

בשעה 16 היום מתחילה הפעולה בנגב.

ᴛʀᴀɴꜱʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴ:

At 16:00 today the operation in the Negev begins. ⁵

The diary names air and naval attacks in the western sector and the planned diversion before the main advance. It is contemporary evidence of leadership’s timetable, not proof that every target was struck precisely as planned. The later battle-site reconstruction gives approximately 17:00 for opening air attacks; that later time need not contradict a 16:00 operation beginning, but original service logs are needed to fix the sequence. ⁶

יגאל אלון YIGAL ALLON commanded the southern front, with יצחק רבין YIẒḤAK RABIN as operations officer in the institutional account. Their combined force employed infantry, armor, air and naval support. The account is a later archival feature, not each formation’s original order. ⁷

The battle for Outpost 86 began late on December 22 and ended in withdrawal on December 23. The raid on Abasan was a distinct action with its own command loss. The campaign continued despite those setbacks. The later institutional narrative of a wider offensive must not hide a local defeat or combine incompatible casualty figures. ⁸

The available records do not provide an independently verified civilian toll from opening bombardments near populated places. A military target or stated purpose does not establish that civilians were unharmed; a place appearing in an attack plan also does not establish its liberation or occupation.

The following day’s diary recorded conditional instructions to protect inhabitants and prevent looting if עזה AZA were liberated. It also recorded the earlier decision to remove residents from three גליל GALIL villages. These were different policies for different circumstances. Neither can be turned into a universal account of conduct, and no liberation of עזה AZA occurred on December 23. ⁹

The committee decision study dates that decision to December 15. Separating civilian policy from the campaign’s military objectives makes responsibility visible without transferring it to all soldiers, all residents or an entire people.

The main eastern effort began December 25. After the failed December 26 attack, ניצנה NIẒANA was liberated December 27. The army then crossed into Sinai Sinai on December 28, while Operation חיסול ḤISUL failed at عراق المنشية ʿIRAQ AL-MANSHIYYA. These outcomes must not be collapsed into a single victorious advance. ^{10 11}

ניצנה NIẒANA, Sinai Sinai and חיסול ḤISUL have separate studies. דוד טל DAVID TAL’s scholarly account reports the killing of surrendering prisoners during חיסול ḤISUL and a serious command dispute over the Sinai Sinai advance. Attribution, original-record gaps and disagreements about losses are retained in those articles.

The January 1 American telegram reported the government’s withdrawal order; the military chronology dates completion to January 2. The withdrawal study distinguishes that movement from the campaign’s January 7 end. Egyptian forces remained at עזה AZA and in the الفالوجة AL-FALUJA pocket. The Security Council’s December 29 ceasefire demand was another dated step, not proof that all fighting stopped immediately. ^{12 13 14}

The December 22 diary pairs the civil date with כ׳ בכסלו ה׳תש״ט 20th 𝑜𝑓 Kislev, AM 5709 and explicitly records a 16:00 opening. The campaign opening retains that route; the late-night ground assault belongs to כ״א בכסלו ה׳תש״ט 21st 𝑜𝑓 Kislev, AM 5709. The planned December 20 start and the December 19 cabinet discussion are separate earlier steps. The opening of an operation at 16:00 does not establish the clock of every air strike or every ground engagement. ^{15 16}

• Why does a campaign’s opening differ from the first ground assault’s Hebrew date?
• How can one record military purpose, local defeat and differing civilian policies without erasing any of them?